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Draft 10/7/16
Accounting for Prosecutors
by Daniel C. Richman*
What role should prosecutors play in promoting citizenship within a liberal democracy?
And how can a liberal democracy hold its prosecutors accountable for playing that role?
Holding others – not just citizens but other institutions – to account is at the core of what
prosecutors do. As gatekeepers to the adjudicatory process, prosecutors shape what
charges are brought and against whom, and will (if allowed to) become shapers of
citizenship. They can also promote police compliance with legal and democratic norms.
Because the prosecutorial role in case creation is largest when crimes are not open and
notorious, prosecutors can moreover play an outsized role in the bringing of cases that
target instances of illegitimate subordination (including domestic violence) and
corruption that are antithetical to a liberal democracy.
After considering ways in which prosecutors might promote democratic values, I explore
how prosecutors can be held to account. Working from existing practices and structures,
I consider how to promote their contributions through legal and institutional design with
respect to reason-giving obligations, geographic scale, insulation from direct political
influence, and modulation of their message.
I.

INTRODUCTION

What role should prosecutors play in promoting citizenship within a liberal democracy?
And how can a liberal democracy hold its prosecutors accountable for playing that role?
While these fundamental questions, regularly posed of the police,1 are asked all too rarely
of prosecutors, answering them requires a lot of framing and bracketing.
Particularly when thinking about prosecutors, we ought not assume that manifestly
democratic processes – say, elections – are the best institutional design for promoting
liberal democratic values. Following the policing literature,2 let us start with those basic
*
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1

See Diarmaid Harkin, Simmel, The Police Form and the Limits of Democratic Policing, 55 Brit. J.
Criminol. 730–46 (2015); see also Andy Aitchison, Jarrett Blaustein, Policing for Democracy or
Democratically Responsive Policing? Examining the Limits of Externally Driven Police Reform,10 Eur. J.
Criminol., 496 (2013).
2

See Trevor Jones, Tim Newburn, & David J. Smith, Policing and the Idea of Democracy, 36 Brit. J.
Criminol. 182 (1996); see also Peter K. Manning, Democratic Policing in a Changing World, 7 (2010)
(suggesting that idea that police should be “part of producing a democratic state” “is getting the entire
argument backward. It is a democratic state and culture that produce democratic policing and, and there is
no evidence that the contrary can result.”).

1

values – political representativeness, a commitment to anti-subordination or (as Ian
Shapiro calls it) non-domination,3 and due process of law – and then consider how
prosecutors can promote them.
But first comes the challenge of avoiding parochialism when identifying what
prosecutors do. Are they freewheeling political actors exercising judicially unreviewable
discretion? Subordinated functionaries exercising highly scrutinized professional
judgment? Prosecutors play extraordinarily varied roles across liberal democracies,
linked only by some shared duty to assess the fitness of criminal cases for adjudication
and to shepherd fit cases through the process. Anne van Aaken usefully sets out the basic
role of a “procuracy”:
(i) it has the competence to gather information on the behavior of criminal
suspects, or to instruct the police to gather more information; (ii) on the basis of
that information it has the competence to indict a suspect; (iii) during a trial it
represents the interests of the public.4
These officials are variously housed in the executive, the judiciary, or a distinct branch of
government,5 but functionally they occupy the space between “police” and “courts.”
This intermediary role provides a methodological point of departure. Others have
focused on the police when exploring how democratic criminal justice institutions must
“balance the goals of coercion and responsiveness,” protecting the citizenry while “still
maintaining the core conditions of democracy.”6 To the extent that policing relies on the
promise or threat of criminal adjudications, the work on democratic policing by David
Bayley, David Sklansky, Peter Manning7 and others offers a valuable starting point for
thinking about prosecutors. My goal here is thus to peel off the distinctive contributions
of prosecutors, distinguishing those from their subsidiary duties.
I will begin, in Part II, by considering the role prosecutors can play in constructing and
sustaining democratic citizenship. This is a story about account giving and account
demanding. Not only do prosecutors present narratives of criminality but they are also
uniquely positioned to hold those who exercise illegitimate power to account and to
promote the accountability of other actors in the criminal justice system.

3

Ian Shapiro, Democratic Justice (1999); see also Ian Shapiro, The Real World of Democratic Theory
(2011).
4

Anne van Aaken, et al., Do Independent Prosecutors Deter Political Corruption? An Empirical Evaluation
Across Seventy-Eight Countries, 12 Am. L. & Econ. Rev. 204, 265 (2010).
5

Michael Tonry, Prosecutors and Politics in Comparative Perspective, 41 Crime and Justice, 1–33 (2012).

6

Amy Lerman and Vesla M. Weaver, Arresting Citizenship: The Democratic Consequences of American
Crime Control, 61 (2014) [hereinafter Lerman & Weaver, Arresting Citizenship].
7

David H. Bayley, Changing the Guard: Developing Democratic Police Abroad (2005); David Alan
Sklansky, Democracy and the Police (2008) [hereinafter Sklansky, Democracy and the Police]; Manning,
supra note 2.
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This vision of prosecutorial contributions comes with an expository bias, because it risks
normalizing the outsized role played by prosecutors in the United States. One can
counteract the bias by remembering to ask whether other state actors are better equipped,
institutionally or as a matter of democratic legitimacy, to perform those functions. Yet,
for better or worse (and especially because I would have it anyway), an American bias
makes sense here.
To be sure, the American prosecutorial “establishment” has been the subject of extensive,
and frequently well-grounded, criticism. Many, most notably Bill Stuntz,8 have written
about the “pathological politics” that drive the legislative authority that U.S. prosecutors
wield. Most outsiders (and many insiders) find the American reliance on elected or
politically connected prosecutors odd, even ridiculous – a fact that itself highlights the
varied and contestable “modes” of public accountability in this area.9 Overshadowing all
is also the extraordinary U.S. incarceration rate, which John Pfaff has convincingly
shown to be driven, at least at the margins, by prosecutorial decision making.10
Yet while no one is keen to admit borrowing anything from the United States in this area,
the American model of the prosecutor as the effective and discretion-exercising
gatekeeper of criminal adjudications seems to be spreading internationally.11 So too is
interest in pursuing the kinds of crimes – ranging from domestic violence to political
corruption – that, as will be seen, the police cannot easily pursue without prosecutorial
assistance that pushes beyond more limited notions of the prosecutorial role.
A final justification for normalizing a maximal conception of the prosecutorial role – at
least as a conversational starting point – rests on my interest in institutional alternatives:
To the extent that other regimes neither assign nor license prosecutors to play a role they
actually or potentially play in the United States, it would be analytically useful to hear
who, if anyone, plays it and the rationales for that assignment.
Part III turns to how a democracy that relies on prosecutors to hold others accountable
can ensure that prosecutors are themselves held to account. The accountability of
prosecutors in a democracy certainly need not be achieved through direct elections.
Indeed, one might argue that only prosecutors highly insulated from direct political
responsibility can really promote democratic values. Still, notwithstanding Ed Rubin’s

8

See William J. Stuntz, The Collapse of American Criminal Justice (2011); William J. Stuntz, The
Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 Mich. L. Rev. 505 (2001).
9

See Michael W. Dowdle, Public Accountability: Conceptual, Historical, and Epistemic Mappings, 1, 14,
in Public Accountability: Designs, Dilemmas and Experiences (Michael W. Dowdle ed., 2006) [hereinafter
Dowdle, Public Accountability].
10

John Pfaff, The Micro and Macro Causes of Prison Growth, 28 Ga. St. Univ. L. Rev. 1 (2012).

11

See Erik Luna & Marianne Wade, Prosecutors as Judges, 67 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1413, 1531 (2010);
see also Máximo Langer, From Legal Transplants to Legal Translations: The Globalization of Plea
Bargaining and the Americanization Thesis in Criminal Procedure, 45 Harv. Int’l L.J. 1 (2004).
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Occam-like analysis of what “accountability” entails,12 the breadth of my normative
vision of what prosecutors should do keeps me from simply valorizing fine-grained
bureaucratic control (of the sort one finds in France, Germany, and Japan – to name just
three paradigmatic cases).
So then, how can I specify the optimal regime of prosecutorial accountability? I can’t
and don’t want to. Once one recognizes the value trade-offs that must inevitably be made
across institutional designs, optimality becomes elusive. A large part of the problem is
that those features well suited to advancing one project won’t be so well suited for
advancing another. Jerry Mashaw credits Gunther Teubner with identifying the
fundamental “regulatory trilemma”: “We demand that regulatory institutions be
simultaneously coherent (the rule of law or regularity norm), effective (a variant of the
efficiency norm), and responsive (open to the influence of social demands and cultural
understandings.” Yet “virtually any attempt to reinforce one of these demands works to
limit the capacity of the regulatory institution to satisfy another.”13 This dilemma looms
large when one thinks about prosecutors. But accountability remains critical. After
noting the limitations of specific accountability paradigms, Part III turns to cross-cutting
institutional design and legal regime considerations that might, when balanced, foster the
legitimacy without which prosecutors can’t, and shouldn’t be allowed to, do their jobs.
II.

CONSTRUCTING AND SUSTAINING DEMOCRATIC CITIZENSHIP

Before considering how prosecutors can shape society, one ought to first nail down the
role of criminal law – the principal instrument of prosecutorial action – in a liberal
democracy. Permit me to bracket this critical question, however, not just because of
limited space but in deference to Ricardo’s Law of Comparative Advantage: I’d much
prefer to stand on the shoulders of Antony Duff, Lindsay Farmer, and others who have
done exceptional work on it.14 For now, I assume that the penal statutes prosecutors
enforce are within the range of possibilities in a tolerably well-functioning liberal
democracy.
The focus here is, first, on the peculiar role of prosecutors in account telling and account
holding: how they set the terms of effective criminalization and build narratives of
criminality. Thereafter, I turn to how, in playing that role, they obtain a privileged

12

Edward Rubin, The Myth of Non-Bureaucratic Accountability and the Anti-Administrative Impulse, 52,
in Dowdle, Public Accountability, supra note 9.
13

Jerry L. Mashaw, Accountability and Institutional Design: Some Thoughts on the Grammar of
Governance, 115, 154, in Dowdle, Public Accountability, supra note 9.
14

Antony Duff, Responsibility, Citizenship and Criminal Law, 125-50, in Philosophical Foundations of
Criminal Law (R.A. Duff & Stuart Green, eds. 2011) [hereinafter Duff, Responsibility, Citizenship and
Criminal Law]; Antony Duff, Discretion and Accountability in a Democratic Criminal Law (in this
volume); Lindsay Farmer, Making the Modern Criminal Law: Criminalization and Civil Order (2016); see
also Sharon Dolovich, Legitimate Punishment in Liberal Democracy, 7 Buff. Crim. L. Rev. 307 (2004);
Tommie Shelby, Punishment, Condemnation, and Social Injustice (unpublished draft) (discussing
justifiable enforcement in an unjust society).
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vantage point within the criminal law enforcement system that allows them to make
demands upon other institutions to promote the collective account-holding project.
A. Constructing Effective Narratives of Criminality
In their distinct role as the translators of general penal provisions into particularized
criminal charges, prosecutors both turn law into action and narrate the circumstances
under which they hold defendants to account. Whether or not prosecutors see themselves
as constructing democratic citizenship when doing so, that is a foreseeable result of their
actions.
1. Turning Generalized Penal Laws into Action Within the Courtroom
The mere passage of penal legislation can have a transformative expressive effect.15
Moreover, one has only to look at cities where minor drug offenses, though not
necessarily charged in court, structure the rationales for police activity on the street,16 to
see how criminal law can actively shape citizenship (i.e. who gets stopped and who
worries that he’ll be stopped) without adjudication. Yet whether because actual
enforcement gives meaning to what otherwise would be empty legislative posturing,
because the police eventually lose authority when the people they arrest never get
charged, or simply because the formal characterization of a specific act or person as
“criminal” is highly consequential, prosecutors – as adjudicative gatekeepers –
potentially play an outsized role in translating criminal “law on the books” to criminal
“law in action.”
Given the absence of any stable transnational definitions of precisely who the police are
and what they do, I suppose a prosecutor could play a perfectly serviceable role within a
liberal democracy without adding more value to case-processing than a notary adds to a
real estate transaction. All the action could be within the police, with the prosecutor
simply filing formal charges selected and prepared by others. But the virtually universal
reliance on lawyers to perform this gatekeeping function (at least for serious offenses)
highlights the non-ministerial role prosecutors are expected to play in performing the
translation function: As the link between the police and the adjudicative process,
prosecutors are responsible for ensuring that a defendant gets the legal process that the
law has deemed his “due” and that liberal democracies value at their core.17 By
proceeding against a defendant only where the evidence supports a charge and where
other legal prerequisites have been met, prosecutors help ensure that the criminal law in

15

See Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 Va. L. Rev. 349 (1997).

16

See Amanda Geller, Pot as Pretext: Marijuana, Race and the New Disorder in New York City Street
Policing, 7 J. Emp. Legal Stud. 591 (2010).
17

See Archon Fung, Practical Reasoning About Institutions: Governance Innovations in the Development
of Democratic Theories, 2-4 (2006) (unpublished manuscript); see also Hung-En Sung, Democracy and
Criminal Justice in Cross-National Perspective: From Crime Control to Due Process, 605 Annals, Am.
Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci. 311, 315 (May 2006).
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action is faithful to the substance of legislated penal statutes and to the values underlying
the larger criminal law project.
Such is the purely “professional” component of the prosecutorial contribution to the
democratic order – “professional” in the narrow sense of law experts drawing on their
training and experience to stitch together facts and determine whether they fit the
definition of a crime.18 Beyond that is a distinctively “political” component – “political”
not necessarily in the sweeping sense of “policy-making” but in the more limited sense of
playing an assigned role in a polity over and above the one a “mere” lawyer might play.
The extent and nature of that political contribution varies across systems but inevitably
entails a modulation of the penal sanctions that the legislature ostensibly mandated for
provable conduct. For now, I will be open as to the nature, formality or legitimacy of this
modulation. Broad notions of “prosecutorial discretion” over what charges they need
bring and against whom allow American prosecutors to effectively “define” criminal law
to be well short of that ostensibly set by statute.19 Conversely, through the cases they
take and the way they frame the facts, American prosecutors regularly push the law
beyond its initially assumed limits.20 Elsewhere, to various degrees, one finds
recognition of prosecutors’ de jure or de facto ability to moderate the severity of penal
consequences in the interests of efficiency, justice, or some combination of the two.
Even where the “principle of legality” – as opposed to those of “opportunity” or
“expediency” – is unmuted, distinctions in the zeal with which evidence is gathered and
investigatory and adjudicative resources committed will exist (whether recognized or
disregarded).
Whether authorized to or not,21 prosecutors will inevitably shape the application of
criminal law to the polities they serve and – to varying extents across regimes – write
their enforcement agendas into the dockets they manage. They also may (or should) take
a peculiar ownership in the punitive outcomes of their work. The police who apprehend a
suspect surely have views on whether and how much he should be punished – views that
prosecutors are bound to take into account.22 I suspect, however, that, absent some
18

Hung-En Sung, supra note 17, at 315 (“A commitment to professionalism and respect for expertise
provide the foundation for an increased insulation of criminal justice operations from political interferences
and populist demands.”).
19

See Gerard E. Lynch, Our Administrative System of Criminal Justice, 66 Fordham L. Rev. 2117 (1998)
[hereinafter Lynch, Our Administrative System]; Máximo Langer, Rethinking Plea Bargaining: The
Practice and Reform of Prosecutorial Adjudication in American Criminal Procedure, 33 Am. J. Crim. L.
223 (2006).
20

See Daniel C. Richman, Kate Stith, & William J. Stuntz, Defining Federal Crimes (2014).

21

See Paul Marcus & Vicki Waye, Australia and the United States: Two Common Criminal Justice Systems
Uncommonly at Odds, Part 2, 18 Tulane J. Int’l & Comp. Law 335, 353 (2010) (noting that in Australia,
concerns about “horse trading” in plea bargaining have spurred concerns that offenders “are not receiving
their ‘just deserts.’”).
22

See Daniel Richman, Prosecutors and Their Agents, Agents and Their Prosecutors, 103 Colum. L. Rev.
749 (2003).
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immediate public safety issue, prosecutors, being far more involved in adjudication, take
a greater interest in the quantity of punishment than cops, since granular issues of
individual desert are more likely to have been developed in conjunction with judicial
processes that follow arrest. Prosecutors’ institutional proximity to the judicial process
may also come with a special capacity to spearhead diversionary programs that reduce
the punitive effects of police enforcement practices.23
The mediating effect played by prosecutors can have a social valence beyond advancing
enforcement preferences and modulating punishment. To the extent there is any play in
the adjudicative joints, they will also be able to exacerbate or mitigate the influence of
racial, social, or political inequality on criminal justice outcomes. The nature of this
capability will vary, as legal or institutional factors promote or undermine “blind justice.”
Particularly in adversarial systems (and again my U.S. bias shows here), the quality of
publicly provided defense counsel24 may have determinative, cascading effects on
adjudicative outcomes. More generally, whether prosecutors take ownership of the
adjudicative process or are simply critical contributors to it, their work will have
distributional effects that they can either consider or ignore. Indeed, because
disadvantaged groups may simultaneously be both over- and under-policed, I use the
term “modulate,” rather than “moderate,” as intervention can lead across cases to both
more and less punitive outcomes.25
My use of “modulate” also reflects the dependency of prosecutorial activity on the work
of other criminal justice components, especially the police and the courts. Perhaps one
reason the scholarly literature has paid more attention to “democratic policing” than
“democratic prosecuting” is that a lot of what prosecutors do is interstitial, dampening the
zeal of some (units or individuals) and spurring others on.
2. Presenting Authoritative Accounts of Criminality
To maintain a transnational focus, I will not say much about how prosecutors can affect
the imposition of punishment on those they bring into the adjudicative process. In the
United States of course – particularly where prosecutors have discretion over whether to
bring charges with mandatory sentencing terms – their ability to shape criminal justice
outcomes is at a zenith.26 Even when prosecutors lack that formal power and when
23

Mary Fan, Street Diversion and Decarceration, 50 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 165, 181 (2013) (noting that
“American diversion programs, like treatment courts, have largely relied on the decision-making of nonpolice actors further down the criminal processing timeline – especially prosecutors,” but arguing for more
police initiatives in this direction); see also Bronwyn Naylor & Adam Fletcher, A Justice Reinvestment
Approach to Criminal Justice in Australia (March 2013).
24

A quality that itself may depend on prosecutorial political advocacy, see infra text accompanying notes
121–122.
25

That such modulating efforts can come from police investigators as well is illustrated by the powerful
story of a few Los Angeles homicide detectives committed to making “black lives matter.” Jill Loevy,
Ghettoside (2015). And I wouldn’t be surprised to read similar accounts of dogged cops elsewhere.
26

See William J. Stuntz, Bordenkircher v. Hayes: Plea Bargaining and the Decline of the Rule of Law, in
Criminal Procedure Stories (Carol Steiker, ed. 2003); Máximo Langer, Rethinking Plea Bargaining: The
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judges have sentencing discretion, prosecutors’ control over the information that flows to
judges and the extent to which judges defer to them can have a similar effect.27 Suffice it
to say that prosecutors who can control or substantially affect adjudicative outcomes will
have a far greater influence on criminal law in action than those who are primarily
gatekeepers.
Even when they act as “mere” gatekeepers, however, one ought not minimize how
prosecutors shape democratic citizenship. Gatekeeping entails not merely the decision
about putting criminal defendant “in jeopardy” and to what extent; it is also a pivotal part
of the process wherein the state authoritatively announces who is, after due process, to be
treated as a “criminal.” Indeed, it is through this condemnation that, as Emile Durkheim
and others have pushed us to realize, a society defines itself.28
Moreover, prosecutors do not silently preside over gates, for the essence of their job is to
explain how the law has been violated. As Jerry Mashaw has noted, inherent in the
adjudication process is not just the application of norms but the creation of them.29 In
addition to holding people accountable in the “modulated” process already described,
prosecutors model accountability through the narrative that the law requires them to tell.
Indeed, the very mechanism for holding defendants to account requires the presentation
of a narrative (an account) that helps construct the socio-legal environment.
To be sure, in numbers and ubiquity, the police surely loom larger than prosecutors as
civic educators. As Ian Loader writes: “The police send authoritative signals to citizens
about the kind of political community of which they are members, the manner in which
that community is governed, and the place they occupy in its extant hierarchies.”30 Yet
we cannot ignore the way the adjudicative process – and not just its outcomes – teaches
citizens about “the political world they inhabit.”31 It is not just the announcement of the
charges – to which political and institutional status of the prosecutor might lend special
resonance and volume – but the manner in which the charges are proved: the evidence
presented and the inferences urged.

Practice and Reform of Prosecutorial Adjudication in American Criminal Procedure, 33 Am. J. Crim. L.
223 (2006).
27

See José Cabranes & Kate Stith, Fear of Judging: Sentencing Guidelines in the Federal Courts (1998).

28

See Frederic Megret, Practices of Stigmatization, 76 J. Law & Contemp. Probs. 287 (2013); Emile
Durkheim, Division of Labor in Society, 40-43 (W.D. Halls, trans. 1984).
29

Jerry L. Mashaw, Accountability and Institutional Design: Some Thoughts on the Grammar of
Governance, 115, 130, in Dowdle, Public Accountability, supra note 9.
30

See Ian Loader, In Search of Civic Policing: Recasting the “Peelian” Principles, Crim. Law & Philos. at 2
(2014); see also Sklansky, Democracy and the Police, supra note 7.
31

Lerman & Weaver, Arresting Citizenship, supra note 6, at 10; see also id. at 111 (suggesting that
“criminal justice contact rivals other more traditional politically socializing experiences and venues for
civic education,” and that “this socialization, unlike other interactions with the government, cleaves
custodial citizens from the broader democratic polity”).
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Malcolm Thorburn has highlighted how, in contrast to criminal law theorists like H.L.A.
Hart, for whom “the point of the criminal trial is simply to determine whether or not the
accused deserves to be punished,” Antony Duff has put the trial center stage. For Duff,
“[t]he criminal trial is a place where members of a political community come together to
engage in discussion about moral wrongdoing.”32 In a trial-driven world, Duff’s dialogic
account is thus particularly useful for distinguishing the distinctive contribution of
prosecutors from that of the criminal law project more generally.
Yes, I realize that in some countries (like mine), trials are rare. The truncated
adjudication characteristic of plea bargaining often renders the authoritative information
ostensibly promised by criminal proceedings thin and formulaic – sometimes with only a
passing relationship to historical fact. A world without trials is thus one without much
moral dialogue about wrongdoing. Of course in theory, the judge presiding over the plea
allocutions and sentencings that replace trials could still ensure a “communicative
interaction between the accused and his accusers.”33 Indeed, in Germany, where plea
agreements are becoming more prevalent,34 the Federal Constitutional Court recently
demanded that judges push far beyond a defendant’s plea-bargained based confession in
order to determine his true culpability.35 At least in the United States though, the churn
of business in busy courtrooms will likely turn the dialogues that Duff celebrates into
generic scripts.36
Still, when there are trials or sustained judicial inquiries, the condemnation sought by
prosecutors and the manner in which they seek it will probably have a texture and nuance
that provide an instrument for social definition going beyond the “criminal” label.
Whether conducted in an accusatory system or an inquisitorial system (but more so in the
former), trials have a performative and narrative aspect.37 Particularly in an adversarial
system, the prosecution’s “case” ends up being a story it tells – a story that may draw on

32

Malcolm Thorburn, Calling Antony Duff to Account, 9 Crim. L. & Philos. 737, 744 (2015); see also
Duff in this volume. Compare H.L.A. Hart, Punishment and Responsibility (1968).
33

Thorburn, supra note 32, at 744.

34

Regina E. Rauxloh, Formalization of Plea Bargaining in Germany: Will the New Legislation Be Able to
Square the Circle, 34 Fordham Int’l L. J. 296, 297 (2011).
35

Alexander Schemmel, Christian Corell & Natalie Richter, Plea Bargaining in Criminal Proceedings:
Changes to Criminal Defense Counsel Practice as a Result of the German Constitutional Court Verdict of
19 March 2013?, 15 German L.J. 43 (2014).
36

Kimberley Brownlee, The Offender’s Part in the Dialogue, in Crime, Punishment, & Responsibility:
Festschrift for Antony Duff, 54 (R. Cruft, M. Kramer & M. Reiff, eds. 2011).
37

See Greta Olson, Narration and Narrative in Legal Discourse, sec. 2, in The Living Handbook of
Narratology (Peter Hühn, ed. May 2014) (“‘Narration’ in legal discourse most commonly denotes the
contest of stories that transpires in adversarial or, with different actors, in inquisitorial trials.”); see also
Robert P. Burns, A Theory of the Trial (1999); Lisa Kern Griffin, Narrative, Truth, and Trials, 101 Geo.
L.J. 281 (2013).
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existing narrative tropes, but that inevitably reinforces, legitimates, and extends them.38
What gets left out can matter as much as what is filled in, as happens, for example, when
a prosecutor, for ease of proof or because the extra sentencing exposure seems
unnecessary, leaves out the bias aspect of what “ought” to be understood as a hate
crime.39
Perhaps the prosecutor will construct a narrative not just of the “crime” but of the
defendant. In common law countries, a prosecutor’s move in that direction will in be
tension with liberal criminal law’s limited interest in delving the depths of personal
culpability40 and with rules of evidence designed to restrict fact-finder attention to the
charged offense. At sentencing, however, broader inquiries may take center stage, and
whether a prosecutor pitches the defendant as a citizen who erred or a miscreant who
needs to be put away can (depending on the sentencing scheme) make all the difference.
Through trials, prosecutors can teach jurors, witnesses, and other lay (or official)
participants about the fairness, or lack thereof, of the criminal justice process. Indeed,
education through jury service is an oft-cited goal in Japan’s recent (albeit limited) move
toward the use of juries in the most serious criminal cases. There, the idea was “to
incorporate sound common sense into the deliberative process, increase public
understanding of Japan's judicial system, promote civic responsibility, and enhance the
tools of democracy available to the citizenry.”41 Those attending (or merely attending to)
the trial can also learn more case-specific “truths” about how the world works, lessons –
about, say, who “really” is a victim and who “deserves” punishment.42 The extent to
which prosecutors drive this “educational” process varies across systems, as does whether
it amounts to a real education or dangerous self-corroboration. Regardless, over time
(and perhaps with media help) such stories will take a life of their own and shape social
norms.43

38

Defense narratives can have similar effects. See Anne M. Coughlin, Excusing Women, 82 Cal. L. Rev. 1,
6 (1994) (“The battered woman syndrome defense rests on and reaffirms [an] invidious understanding of
women's incapacity for rational self-control.”).
39

Avlana Eisenberg, Expressive Enforcement, 61 UCLA L. Rev. 858, 889 (2014).

40

See Marie-Eve Sylvestre, Rethinking Criminal Responsibility for Poor Offenders: Choice, Monstrosity,
and the Logic of Practice, 55 McGill L. J. 771 (2010).
41

Matthew J. Wilson, Japan’s New Criminal Jury System: In Need of More Transparency, More Access,
and More Time, 33 Ford. Int’l L. J. 487, 493 (2010).
42

See Candida L. Saunders, The Truth, The Half-Truth, and Nothing Like the Truth: Reconceptualizing
False Allegations of Rape, 52 Brit. J. Criminol. 1152 (2012) (exploring judgments of U.K. front-line law
enforcement professionals as to rape allegations); see also Louise Ellison & Vanessa E. Munro, Turning
Mirrors into Windows? Assessing the Impact of (Mock) Juror Education in Rape Trials, 49 Brit. J.
Criminol. 363 (2009).
43

For an extreme version of this larger social influence, see Adriaan Lanni’s exploration of the effect on
civic norms of trial speeches at Athenian trials. Law and Order in Ancient Athens (2016).
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Of course, defendants receive an education as well. As Ben Justice and Tracey Meares
observe, “for an increasing number of Americans, the criminal justice system plays a
powerful and pervasive role in providing a formal education in what it means to be a
citizen.”44 The lessons that prosecutors “teach” can go beyond the specific social norms
implicated by the charged conduct. What a serious criminal prosecution amounts to, at
least in the United States, is an effort to detach a defendant from society, not just as a
physical matter but as a political one.45 These citizenship lessons reach, and affect the
lives of, not just convicted defendants but those around them.46
To what extent should a democratic prosecutor self-consciously promote the range of
epiphenomenal externalities that attend a criminal conviction? When American
prosecutors deliberately tease apart what ostensibly looks like a bundled conviction
outcome – bargaining around immigration consequences for individuals,47 or around the
collateral consequences of corporate convictions48 – are they circumventing legislative
intent or sensitively navigating a legislative menu? Even when prosecutors purport to
stay within the four corners of their adjudicative assignment, should we encourage
reflection on larger audience responses or regret it? My instinct is always on the side of
self-reflection, but Duff is surely right to worry about maximal self-consciousness at the
individual level.49 For now, let us simply recognize the social consequences of the
prosecutorial project, whether appreciated or not.
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B. Holding More than the Usual Suspects Accountable
The point of departure for the foregoing section had the prosecutor deciding how to
proceed when the police have presented her with a suspect. This section considers how
prosecutors, because of their adjudicative function, are uniquely positioned not simply to
seek the accountability of those presented to them but to push beyond the frame the
police have constructed and to promote the accountability of others as well, including the
police themselves.
1. Promotion of Police Accountability
The role prosecutors play in promoting citizen accountability may be complemented by
their influence on the police – the primary point of contact for citizens with the criminal
justice establishment – as monitors and mediators. One needs to be careful here, as there
is tremendous variation across countries – and within them, at least in the United States –
on this potential contribution to the rule of law and democratic accountability. Jacqueline
Hodgson has explored the limited degree to which the French procureur supervises police
investigations.50 In England and Wales, it remains to be seen whether the Crown
Prosecution Service (“CPS”) has the institutional capacity to push police forces to build
stronger cases.51 In the United States, the lack of any hierarchy that would oblige police
to attend to prosecutorial preferences (or vice versa) frequently leads to institutional
disjunction, not coordination.52
Still, prosecutors’ position as gatekeepers of the adjudicative process and their unique
ability to deploy both technical expertise and experience as repeat players before ultimate
adjudicators give them leverage to question and perhaps change police behavior (at least
across those police domains that rely on the credible threat of adjudicative action). These
sources of authority – whether deployed or not – exist even in the absence of the sort of
institutional clout that prosecutors might gain from political independence (of the sort
wielded by elected district attorneys in the United States). They draw not just on
prosecutor’s special knowledge and the reputational bonding that arises out of their
repeat-player status,53 but on their legal training and acculturation. Intermediation, after
all, is what lawyers are trained to do – between clients and court or regulators, between
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clients, and across institutional cultures. As Sklansky has suggested, intermediation lies
at the heart of the prosecutorial function.54
Richard Mulgan explains:
Forcing people to explain what they have done is perhaps the essential component
of making them accountable. In this sense, the core of accountability becomes a
dialogue between accountors and account-holders . . . using a shared language of
justification.55
The ability of citizens to directly hold police officers “to account” for their granular
decision making varies considerably across polities,56 and changes with technologies (as
has been seen with viral videos in the United States). Even so, the essential opacity of
the criminal process substantially limits their ability to do so in even the most open
democracies. Prosecutors, however, have a privileged vantage point. From there, they
can force police officers to “explain what they have done” – how the arrest was effected,
the investigation conducted, the witness questioned. Even as the questions generally
arise in a case-specific context, the answers (and perhaps the motivation for the
questions) will often cut across cases. To be sure, the degree to which prosecutorial
views – as supplemented by the views of other adjudicatory actors – are internalized by
police forces may be a function of, among other things, the extent to which there is
mutual dependence (what I have called “team production”57) and the political clout of
each side. But prosecutors’ potential contribution to overall criminal justice
accountability ought to be recognized and extended, particularly where, as in England
and Wales, the legal architecture is no impediment.58
2. Targeting Illegitimate Exercises of Power
Further consideration of the dynamics of interaction between the police and prosecutors
should push us to think, not just about how prosecutors can promote police accountability
across all case types, but also about how prosecutors can foster the pursuit of one subset
of criminal conduct that they are peculiarly capable of addressing – the illegitimate
exercises of power that disrespect the individual autonomy at the heart of liberal
democracy.
54
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Sklansky has powerfully argued that “‘democratic policing’ should mean . . . making the
police as effective as possible in combating unjustified patterns of private domination and
unthreatening as possible as a tool of official domination.”59 For their part, prosecutors
can help free citizens from the subordination that is antithetical to a liberal democracy
merely by avoiding illegitimate self-aggrandizement60 and shepherding appropriately
made criminal cases through the adjudicative process.
A great deal of regular police work can relieve citizens of illegitimate exercises of power.
Any city dweller can tell you how the wide berth given to the menacing street tough
narrows when a cop appears. Yet, some of the worst exercises of illegitimate power take
more than a cop’s quick glance to be recognized as such. These are situations where a
prosecutor’s slow second look can make a big difference in uncovering and pursuing
these exercises.
Consider the difference between extortion and robbery. In a robbery, “the threat, the
point at which the threatened act will occur, and the consent all happen around the same
time. The robber says ‘your money or your life,’ and the victim, fearing immediate harm,
hands over his wallet.”61 A police officer encountering this scene will quickly figure out
what is happening, and if she can’t, the victim will explain. Extortion is very different.
Here the bad guy may say “make regular payments to me or I will hurt you and your
family.” When the victim pays, the transaction will look pretty ordinary; the police
officer who encounters it will have no reason to think otherwise, and, in all too many
cases, the victim won’t explain.62 Indeed, the worse – the more serious and the more
enduring – the exercise of illegitimate power, the more “natural” the transaction will look
and the less likely the victim will be to tell the police about it. Indeed, some “victims,”
might not even feel victimized, like those who make payoffs to public officials – payoffs
that are ultimately included in the contract price, which in turn is often paid by the state
and its taxpayers.
Then there are instances of private oppression that might occasion a call to the police and
a response, but that won’t make it through the adjudication process without special
attention. This is the world of domestic violence, where, if a case ever makes it to trial,
the defendant’s chief witness will often be the victim herself, and the prosecution’s case
will have to be made through evidence collected with an eye to just such an asymmetric
adjudication.63 Avlana Eisenberg has found similar dynamics at work in hate crime
59
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investigations, where, in the absence of prosecutorial prodding, police officers regularly
avoid considering motive, looking only to physical harm.64 It is also the world of
organized crime.
Perhaps every case of domestic violence, gang intimidation, or official corruption does
not threaten democracy. But impunity does. These are the offenses where the harm goes
well beyond the injury suffered from specific acts, and where the exercise of illegitimate
power can cripple the ability of victims and those around them to flourish as individuals
and citizens. Because what makes these exercises of power particularly insidious is that
their illegitimacy won’t be conspicuous to outsiders, these are precisely the cases unlikely
to be successfully developed and pursued without prosecutors taking the lead.
Let me not overstate the point. Can one envision that the same kind of dedicated
detective work that one sees in homicide dramas (pick your country), and sometimes in
real life, can build domestic violence and hate crime cases and doggedly pursue
organized crime and corruption cases? Of course, especially if one considers the wide
range of institutional arrangements across jurisdictions and assumes the requisite resource
commitments. Police departments with hate crime units are more likely to follow
through on their institutional commitment to bias cases,65 and the same dynamics can be
expected with domestic violence, and perhaps even organized crime. Still, the pressures
on police forces with patrol and crime control responsibilities are indefeasible and all too
often – particularly when murder has not occurred and victims are not complaining –
come at the cost of the intensive police work needed to investigate crimes not in plain
view.66
These are pressures that prosecutors are well positioned to counter and compensate for.
There is evidence that they can do just that, if properly supported. In the United States,
studies have found that a combination of “no drop” policies and a high degree of
coordination between police and specialized prosecutors is the key to increasing the
success of domestic violence prosecutions.67 In England and Wales, in the face of
“disappointingly mixed reports about the extent to which [U.K. police] forces and the
CPS are pursuing evidence-led prosecutions” in domestic violence cases, authorities have
highlighted the gap between articulated prosecutorial needs and police investigative
efforts.68 In Germany, on the other hand, where an overwhelming proportion of domestic
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violence cases end up dismissed, a 2004 report faulted the police for not gathering
adequate evidence and prosecutors for being too prone to abide by victim inclinations to
drop.69
In domestic violence cases, prosecutors’ unique competence lies in their ability to
preserve what might be unstable evidence of criminal conduct, with an eye to the
demands of an especially challenging adjudicative process. In cases involving more
organized criminal conduct, their unique competence lies in their deployment of the
adjudicative process itself to investigate and prove criminal conduct. Again, with due
recognition of my American bias, I make only a provisional claim about how organized
criminal activity and particularly corruption can most productively be pursued. The
claim, though, is that enforcers can go after embedded criminal activity only if they can
obtain closely held private information from those with their own criminal culpability,
and that the only effective “currency” is leniency in adjudicative outcomes. Prosecutors’
adjudicative role thus makes them necessary actors in this investigative process – which
often will proceed in grand juries, the special province of U.S. prosecutors70 – and their
efforts will determine how high up a criminal hierarchy penal sanctions can go.
Certainly the use of deal-brokered accomplice testimony has become (for better or worse)
a hallmark of U.S. organized crime and corruption prosecutions.71 Indeed, my sense is
that some of the interest in “American style” prosecutions – in Brazil, for example –
comes from a desire to replicate U.S. tactics in such cases.72 And Shawn Marie Boyne
reports that even in Germany, where “there is still widespread denial … regarding the use
of ‘confession agreements’ in major crime cases,” deals are regularly made and are of
particular use in corruption cases.73 She also notes that, even though most cases in
Germany start with a police investigation whose matured fruits will only thereafter be
sent to prosecutors, the very nature of economic crime and corruption cases requires
considerable prosecutor–police cooperation from the start.74
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Mind you, the claim is not that prosecutors are inherently white knights questing to
relieve subordination in the home or on gang turf and ready to target those who would
abuse the democratic process for private ends. Nor is it that criminal law is necessarily
the best vehicle for furthering these goals. Rather I merely suggest that if criminal
sanctions are going to be used, prosecutors will have to play an outsized role in the
process – certainly larger than the one they play in “regular” episodic criminal cases and
at least as large as that normally played by the police. In contrast to street crimes, if
prosecutors are not spearheading the pursuit of, say, corruption, those cases are unlikely
to happen.
3. Prosecutors and Legislative Accountability
The accountability that prosecutors can bring to the police will play out at both the retail
and wholesale levels: When a prosecutor questions the legality of an arrest or the
sufficiency of the evidence the police provide to support formal charges, the iterated
nature of this kind of case can lead to broader policy discussions or disputes. How about
other branches of government? To what extent should prosecutors be able to hold
legislators’ feet to the fire on criminal justice issues?
In theory, were criminal justice outputs sufficiently valued and closely monitored by the
elected officials responsible for constructing and funding the operative legal regime, a
high degree of insulation from politics would not impair the democratic prosecutorial
mission, and could indeed promote it. Not only is there always a risk of institutional selfdealing, but the separation of everyday politics from the administration of criminal justice
can further rule-of-law values at the heart of democratic liberalism.
When it comes to institutional self-dealing, the United States provides a dramatic object
lesson. Many have noted how the federal Justice Department regularly proposes and
shapes the legislative products of Congress.75 Federal prosecutors also shape the
effective scope of legislation through the cases they choose to pursue and the legal
interpretations they promote through carefully chosen facts.76 Yet more notable than the
influence of one co-equal political branch on another at the federal level have been the
sustained and successful efforts of local prosecutors to block and advance criminal justice
measures in their statehouses. Michael Campbell, for example, has given a powerful
account of how, between 1989 and 1993, Texas prosecutors blocked sentencing reform
and pushed for prison expansion. He notes:
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Texas prosecutors were influential because they provided an important link
between state and local politics, and because prosecutors have specialized skills
linked to their position as legal experts and political actors. They operated as an
important interpreter of popular demands, and as a powerful voice in opposing
legal changes that would limit their discretion.77
That prosecutors – working within a plea-bargaining regime that allows them to use the
threat of harsher sentences and expansive liability theories to induce defendants to give
their trial rights – have endeavored to reduce judicial sentencing discretion is not
particularly surprising, however regrettable.78 More disheartening, at least from a
democracy-promoting perspective, has been their opposition to (or simply tepid support
for) the adequate funding for indigent defense schemes.79 Prosecutorial involvement in
the larger political process thus can come with real costs to liberal values.
That said, prosecutorial insulation from the political process when those within it do not
adequately attend to the health of the criminal justice system comes with a different set of
costs. For a sense of these costs, one needs only to look at instances where the insulation
of prosecutors has left them unable to prevent their work from being undercut, even
nullified by political actors. Carlo Rossetti reports that in Italy, when a “tiny group of
magistrates” brought major corruption cases, those just ended up on the long queue of
cases awaiting trial, subject to legislated deadlines for disposal of cases that gave the
targets of long corruption probes “de facto impunity.”80 In England and Wales, the
CPS’s lack of political clout has come with an underfunding that surely has system-wide
effects.81 The abuses of lobbying power ought not blind us to the role prosecutors can
play as engaged and knowledgeable reform leaders.
III.

ACHIEVING DEMOCRATIC FUNCTIONALITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY
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Having explored some of the ways in which prosecutors can contribute to a wellfunctioning democracy, one can easily jump to a number of basic questions: First, to what
extent do we want prosecutors to play these roles? Second, are other institutions better
suited to play each role, and why? And third, what institutional design trade-offs might
both serve these goals and ensure prosecutorial accountability? I can’t image any
categorical answers to these questions, which all involve foundational political choices
and require engagement with the entire socio-legal structure in which the criminal justice
regime, and the prosecutorial establishment in particular, is enmeshed.
Yet once again shielded by Ricardo’s law, let me go straight to the third question. And
on even this, I start with critical caveats that (I hope) excuse the level of abstraction (and,
again, the American bias) with which I proceed. Even as I talk generally about
institutional characteristics, I’ll give scant attention to the precise institutional designs
that generate them. This sweep is in part dictated by an interest in trans-jurisdictional
breadth. But it is also dictated by a lack of correspondence between de jure and de facto
features of prosecutorial regimes. When trying to take “systematic stock” of
prosecutorial independence transnationally, for example, van Aaken et al. found that the
correlation between de jure and de facto indicia of prosecutorial independence (i.e. tenure
and formal accountability to political hierarchs vs. actual forced retirements, and changes
in legal foundations for the prosecution of crimes) was “slightly negative.”82 Indeed,
they found a slight correlation between de jure prosecutorial independence and higher
levels of perceived corruption.83 And they suggest that “this finding reflects reversed
causality: Due to gentle pressure to fight corruption, many governments have passed
fresh legislation granting their prosecutors more formal independence. Yet, formal
legislation often remains unenforced.”84
Permit me, then, to provisionally speculate in general terms about the coherence of
various institutional design features with the various democracy-advancing roles that
prosecutors might play. Put differently, let me return to the question of how to promote
democratic accountability for prosecutors within existing structures. I’ll first note the
limitations of specific accountability paradigms and then step beyond them to explore
cross-cutting institutional design and legal regime considerations.
A. Accountability Paradigms and Their Limitations
Mulgan has usefully set out several accountability typologies: “legal (external with high
control), political (external with low control), bureaucratic (internal with high control),
professional (internal with low control).”85 Each of these, to varying extents and in
varying combinations, has been extended to prosecutorial establishments. The United
States is somewhat of an outlier in its reliance on fragmented authority and direct
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political accountability, with most liberal democracies relying on a mix of legal and
bureaucratic mechanisms.
Does an embrace of the full measure of contributions that prosecutors can make to
democracy necessarily imply preference for a particular kind of prosecutorial
establishment and blend of accountability typologies? I’m not sure. Here, the
“regulatory trilemma” identified by Teubner appears in the tradeoffs required when we
balance regularity against effectiveness against responsiveness.86 Consider the most
dramatic project from Part II: the crusading prosecutor committed to curing democracy
deficits by taking on entrenched interests in government or at its periphery. The stuff of
legends, movies,87 and sometimes reality. Such a figure is unlikely to step out of a
bureaucracy tightly tethered – by culture, hierarchy, regulation or some combination
thereof88 – to a central authority anchored in the political status quo.89 One would not
expect grand corruption to be a central interest of this bureaucracy, and in France (to take
one example) it hasn’t been.90
Move to a different project, and the analysis changes radically. Even when maximally
pursued, grand corruption cases are but a small part of the prosecutorial diet. In most
cases, the project of punishment modulation becomes most salient, and bureaucratic
regularity has considerable appeal. Indeed, the very notion of a prosecutor playing a selfconscious democracy-promoting role may be anathema to those looking for consistency,
professionalism, and compliance with positive law.
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Even were we to select only for the crusading project, I’m not sure what the optimal
prosecutorial arrangement would be. Rossetti attributes the zeal of the Italian judges and
prosecutors who pursued corruption in the 1990s to their constitutionally secured
independence, which “protects them from arbitrary interference by the executive and
legislative branches.”91 DiFederico, on the other hand, questions the attribution of
anticorruption zeal to the independence and low democratic accountability of Italian
prosecutors, noting that prosecutors were similarly insulated during a long period of
inactivity.92 Indeed when prosecutors are too well insulated, citizen voices against
impunity – a possible wellspring of zeal and democratic commitment – will also be
muted. It was just such voices, from local anti-corruption groups, that prodded local
prosecutors in Indonesia into action, according to a recent World Bank study.93 (This is
not to say that those voices were enough. The study also tells how local Indonesian
anticorruption movements had trouble sustaining public pressure as cases inched through
the legal process and how they had scant influence once cases moved up to the
centralized appeals process.94)
Fear not, appreciating how public pressure can galvanize prosecutors into action does not
lead me to support prosecutorial elections, even in service of the crusading project. After
all, the politics that drive prosecutorial elections will usually be those in which a corrupt
elite is enmeshed. Even the pursuit of sex abuse cases within a specific community can
fall victim to political expediency.95 Whether or not the prosecutor has any further
political ambitions (and an important subset do), virtually all will have political
affiliations that give pause to those looking for magisterial purity. Even if one assumes
that the claims of partisan targeting that will inevitably attend prosecutions frequently
lack foundation, the risk both real and perceived that criminal cases will be treated as an
extension of partisan warfare is real, and has become a standard American trope.96
Indeed, I would go further and suggest that, even in the country where prosecutorial
elections are the norm – to the understandable dismay of most domestic and comparative
scholars97 – embrace of them as instruments of democratic accountability and nonbureaucratic zeal has been at best half-hearted. Many have cogently argued that the
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dominant American approach offers the worst of all worlds: Because the elections are
generally not seriously contested, they offer little in the way of accountability, yet the
populism they inject into the process still impedes the thoughtful exercise of prosecutorial
authority.98 But it bears remembering that the idea behind the move to popular elections
– widespread in the second quarter of the nineteenth century – was more defensive than
offensive: to deflect efforts of governors and legislators to use appointment system for
political patronage.99 Such defensiveness is somewhat of a theme across American
prosecutorial establishments. In the federal system, for instance, the relative
independence of appointed U.S. attorneys from the political hierarchs in Washington has
been (regularly, but not always) fostered by Congress less in the interest of controlling
the districts themselves than to prevent the President and his circle from exercising such
control.100 Note how this theme accepts and perhaps even reinforces a regime in which
prosecutorial discretion is at its apogee: Rather than rein in prosecutors – through
legislative specificity, closer judicial supervision, or binding executive guidelines – the
institutional design project has been more to prevent the political deployment of the
office by other hubs of governmental power. And even that project has been hostage to
contingency and history, as we discovered when President George W. Bush tried to cull
his United States attorneys.101
It is hardly a defense of the American embrace of direct political accountability to
observe that it furthers negative goals that are different from those ostensibly targeted.
But in the end, my expository goal is also negative. I have simply taken a handful of
many possible democracy-promoting projects for prosecutors and suggested why it may
be difficult, even with that limited focus, to figure out the optimal institutional
arrangements to promote them. I’ve considered only the choice between a politically
insulated bureaucracy and elected political hierarchs. Just think how hard the equation
gets if we also consider different doctrinal approaches to prosecutorial decision making –
“principle of legality” vs. the “principle of opportunity” – or different modes of factfinding, adversarial vs. inquisitorial. One would then have to account for path-dependent
and historically contingent traditions that foster institutional cultures. And then, if the
goal is really to have a tournament of systems, one would have to look at the entire array
of ways that prosecutors might promote democracy, opine on the efficacy with which
each system promotes each goal, and devise some global means of balancing. Perhaps
someone can actually do this. I lack the data, competence, and inclination.
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So where does this leave us? Even as various states reassess aspects of their legal
regimes and institutional structure, path dependency limits formal change – particularly
in an area where informal adaptation is usually more convenient to insiders. If we are to
be attentive to ways in which liberal democracies can support prosecutors, as well as vice
versa, better that we speak of the principles that ought to guide change or stability across
diverse institutional arrangements, rather than celebrate or condemn particular regimes.
B. Principles Cutting Across Accountability Typologies
When assessing the normative promise of institutional arrangements, we should heed
Andreas Schedler’s reminder:
Holding power accountable does not imply determining the way it is exercised;
neither does it aim at eliminating discretion through stringent bureaucratic
regulation. It is a more modest project that admits that politics is a human
enterprise whose elements of agency, freedom, indeterminacy, and uncertainty are
ineradicable; that power cannot be subject to full control in the strict, technical
sense of the word.102
Mindful of this counsel, I will offer a few modest principles with application across
diverse prosecutorial regimes. Obviously incomplete, the list is, at best, a good first step.
1. Language of Rationality and Equality
At a bare minimum, those exercising power need to be able to explain themselves – give
an “account” – to someone, somehow. There are also normative constraints on what
those explanations can be – one being that the language sound in rationality and equality.
Any prosecutorial establishment must, as Jerry Mashaw has put it, give “operational
content” to the “public reason approach” that provides legitimacy to those “modern states
characterised by both democratic aspirations and a heavily administrative institutional
structure.”103 And the public reasons offered need to themselves be true to democratic
values.
If, like Edward Rubin, one defines accountability “as the ability of one actor to demand
an explanation or justification of another actor for its actions, and to reward or punish the
second actor on the basis of its performance or explanation,”104 we can easily see how a
highly bureaucratic system, with line actors acting at the direction of and under the
hierarchal control of supervisors who themselves are similarly accountable, can limit the
reasons a line prosecutor may give and formally preclude the exercise of “discretion.”105
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Yet the challenges of ex ante specification are endemic (though perhaps not unique) to
penal systems and particularly great when the “principle of legality” requires the pursuit
of every makeable case.
Canonical and bureaucratic restriction of the language of prosecutorial justification may
thus drive the action underground, with mixed normative results. Consider Germany. As
Shawn Boyne explains:
[A] significant part of a German prosecutor’s initial training involves one-on-one
training in the art of documenting actions taken on a case file. Not only does this
one-on-one training ensure that prosecutors accurately and consistently document
the history of a case in the case file, the training systematically conveys the
routines of organizational practice to newcomers entering the organization. . . . In
theory, any prosecutor could pick up another prosecutor’s file and immediately
understand the case.106
Such documentation may come with risks of, indeed an invitation to, disingenuity. In a
plea for more candor about prosecutorial discretion in Germany and elsewhere, Erik Luna
has noted that “some European systems have … preserved orthodox interpretations of the
legality principle only by denying the existence of prosecutorial power.”107 This quiet
opacity has upsides: Luna suggests that “mandatory prosecution” (a principle that
Germany has relaxed only for low-level or juvenile cases108) – might be seen as a
“necessary fiction” that “maintain[s] prosecutorial independence from the political
process and [] protect[s] prosecutors from charges of arbitrary decisionmaking.”109 Yet
Thomas Weigend properly notes how the move ends up shielding the prosecutor from
personal responsibility,110 with a consequent loss of even conversational accountability.
In such circumstances, perhaps bureaucratic accountability mechanisms can profitably be
supplemented with political ones. In recognition of the democracy deficit endemic to
bureaucratic hierarchies, the Venice Commission has noted the increasing use of
“prosecuting councils” across Europe. It observes: “If they are composed in a balanced
way, e.g. by prosecutors, lawyers and civil society, and when they are independent from
other state bodies, such councils have the advantage of being able to provide valuable
expert input in the appointment and disciplinary process and thus to shield them at least
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to some extent from political influence. Depending on their method of appointment, they
can provide democratic legitimacy for the prosecution system.”111
If the characteristic fault of German prosecutors is to deny that there is any discretion to
explain, that of American prosecutors – and it is probably more grievous – is to offer
scant explanation for starkly discretionary decisions. Here, what can often be a
substantial absence of bureaucratic accountability – particularly in county-based state
systems, but to varying extents everywhere – is justified (such as it is) by reference to a
political accountability far more direct than a “prosecuting council.”
To some extent, the direct (or in the federal system, indirect) electoral accountability of
U.S. prosecutors can lead to public reasoning about priorities and policies. But public
discourse in the United States about prosecutorial choices is limited, not just because of
the opacity of the plea bargaining process but – even for those cases that go to trial –
because of evidentiary rules that preclude the presentation of a great deal of information
considered in the decision to charge, as well as legislation lacking much specificity, and a
doctrinal framework that frees prosecutors from ever explaining why charges were not
brought.112 Moreover, as anyone familiar with the “politics of crime” in the United States
knows,113 wildly swinging electoral politics will often undercut the ability of prosecutors
to promote reasoned local conversations (even when they are interested in doing so).114
Americans could, of course, ask more of prosecutors in the courtroom. Indeed, cogent
arguments have long been made for empowering judges – as either a statutory or
constitutional matter – to demand justifications for charging and plea bargaining
decisions.115 Formal authority in this regard might simply complement the soft power
that trial judges frequently deploy – to various extents in various jurisdictions: the ability
to sternly peer from the bench, say that the prosecutor “must be joking,” and ensure that
the prosecutor who “doesn’t get with the program” regrets it. Yet the general reluctance
of appellate courts and legislators to give judges de jure authority is not just a matter of
separation of power formalism but deep-seated (however contestable) concerns about
institutional competence.
Would the accountability of American prosecutors be usefully enhanced if they no longer
had absolute immunity to constitutional tort suits for conduct relating to their
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adjudicatory decisionmaking?116 I suspect not, since only the most egregious and
provably illegal conduct provides the basis for relief in suits when immunity is
“qualified” – as it is for the police or for prosecutors acting in an investigative
capacity.117 I would also want a better sense of what the noise-to-signal ratio would be,
were this litigation avenue opened up. That said, egregious prosecutorial conduct has
occurred with sad regularity. At the very least, placing prosecutors on equal footing with
the police and dispensing with the need to distinguish between advocacy and
investigative work by prosecutors would eliminate the distortions in constitutional tort
law created when the interconnectiveness of prosecutorial and police activity is ignored
and when those seeking relief for wrongful convictions have to focus on police
conduct.118 Since wrongful conviction cases can spark reform outside the courts even
when unsuccessful within them, it is particularly important to get the whole story across
all relevant institutions.
That electoral accountability may contribute little to public reasoning and courts may lack
much formal power to demand rationales does not mean that American prosecutors are
not subject to other, more sustained and granular, pressures to explain their actions. As a
descriptive matter, there are a variety of other accountability mechanisms that demand
attention and that, as a normative matter, might be strengthened – mechanisms not unique
to American prosecutors but, in absence of the top-down bureaucratic dialogue seen
elsewhere, are of particular importance in the United States.
My claim is not that the mesh of networked institutions in which prosecutors in the
United States (and perhaps elsewhere) do their work necessarily provides low-visibility
channels for reasoned justification and democratic legitimacy, but that it can. Just as
prosecutors can monitor the police, so too can the police monitor prosecutors and ask
them to explain their adjudicatory positions.119 To the extent that the police are, by
structure or task, bound to the citizenry they serve, we should expect some of their
accountability to carry over to prosecutors who depend on police work. Indeed, the lack
of a hierarchical relationship between police and prosecutors, combined with their
distinct professional cultures, might provoke more reasoned deliberation than otherwise.
Sure, beat cops usually don’t second-guess charging decisions, even when made by
rookie (or overly jaded) prosecutors. But the iterated nature of their interaction, and their
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distinct chains of command, brings the possibility of a dialogue that may even enrich
public debate.120
Iterated interaction between police and prosecutors is not unique to liberal democracies.
The same creative tensions presumably arise in authoritarian states, without necessarily
contributing to democratic accountability. What distinguishes the interactions in a liberal
democracy is the nature of the institutions involved, with the possibility that police and
prosecutors there have diverse political anchors that bring a dialogic richness (perhaps
with expletives) to their conversations. What also distinguishes them is that, in an open
society and a media interested in crime news,121 these arguments easily spill into public
discourse. Similar provocation for public reasoning may – for some offenses – come
from victims, should they get an adequate forum – whether formally in court (as in some
continental systems) or less formally, in communities and the media.
Then there are defense lawyers: Even in the absence of strong adjudicative controls over
prosecutorial decisions, one might also imagine that, in an adversary system, defense
counsel might still do yeoman service in pushing prosecutors to explain, if not justify,
their discretionary decisions. Indeed, Jerry Lynch has provocatively imagined a world in
which plea dispositions emerge out of textured discussions that reflect a “common law”
across cases.122
The last two paragraphs were pretty tentative, however, as was Lynch’s insightful piece.
Foundational to the accountability narratives just adumbrated are vigorous institutional
players and what Mulgan called a “shared language of justification.”123 This means there
must be thoughtful collaboration between police and prosecutors, fora where victims and
affected community can listen and speak, and well-resourced defenders. If American
prosecutors are to have a claim to democratic legitimacy through this networked
accountability, these mechanisms need strengthening. The German prosecutor bound by
the principle of legality will justifiably be hard pressed to explain her exercise of
discretion. The American prosecutor with sweeping discretion both as a matter of law
and practice lacks this excuse. Yet all too often, she deploys lame mantras of
“prosecuting to the full extent of the law.”124
Note how a key aspect of the American accountability narrative – and this is a common
thread in all adversarial systems – requires prosecutors to exert their political power to
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support defense institutions, especially for the indigent, who comprise a majority of
criminal defendants. The same independence that insulates prosecutors from other
executive and legislative actors thus finds a modicum of justification when deployed to
support a countervailing source of accountability, for the legitimacy of prosecutorial
power in part demands that they be able to explain themselves to their adversaries.
Moreover, the sense of a joint project cutting across legal roles promotes a professional
accountability that cuts across cases. As Mulgan notes, professional accountability, while
potentially flowing from formal disciplinary mechanisms, can also arise from the way
members of a profession are “answerable to each other through shared networks and
collegial relationships.”125
This answerability across institutional divides is quite different from transparency.
Transparency, of course, is a critical democratic norm, and calls for “the broad visibility
of government decision making” have been a powerful and understandable part of recent
criminal justice critiques.126 Still, formal transparency is not an unalloyed good,
particularly if it provides levers for less engaged, and perhaps overly punitive, actors to
intervene in downstream decisionmaking. Such is the lesson of federal sentencing
history between 1989 and 2007.127 Such has also often been the experience in the United
States when, to promote consistency within a jurisdiction or an office, bureaucratic
promulgations have limited line prosecutor options. While transparent governance does
not have an inherent punitive tendency, when coupled with punitive politics it has
ratcheting effects. When looking across systems, we would thus do well to think more
about promoting a “shared language of justification” for use across a variety of
institutional interactions, even those the public cannot and should not know about.
2. Scale of Accountability
Although often lost in discussions of democratic accountability, any inquiry into the
relationship of prosecutors to democracy needs to consider scale. How big need the
polity in whose name the prosecutor acts be? And need that polity be the same one that
produces the criminal laws being enforced?
Duff gracefully explains how one “distinctive and proper purpose” of “our criminal law”
is to “call someone to account,” a process that requires a “normative community to which
both called and callers can be said to belong.”128 But why can’t the community in whose
name a defendant is called and the prosecutor is doing the calling be unrepresentative,
even peculiar, elements of the larger polity whence come the laws themselves? Niki
Lacey and David Soskice have cogently argued that local autonomy has been a key driver
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of over-punitiveness in the United States.129 Still, the division of law-making vs. lawapplying authority embodied in the county-based system offers, what, in theory at least,
could be a productive blending of small vs. larger community norms. Moreover, one
might imagine that, however selected, a local prosecutor – anchored by the local nature of
so much criminal enforcement – will provide just this blending. Perhaps at some point
local variation is an affront to the norm of equal citizenship. Yet one can also embrace
the inevitable variation of a loosely linked “federal” system and make that variation itself
a feature of the membership that a citizen enjoys.
Even in far more centralized and bureaucratized France, Jacqueline Hodgson and Andrew
Roberts tell us:
[I]t is recognised that the prosecutor’s discretion is an important part of adapting
prosecution policy to local conditions and concerns – an example of the influence
that certain social and systemic pressures in the broad surround can have on
subjective decision-making. The aim may be to manage the flow of cases,
charging some offences at a lower level so that they remain in a mid-level court
and are not subjected to the lengthy instruction procedure. . . . Or the aim may be
to respond to local mores and expectations.130
Yet considerations of scale – which may depend on a polity’s embrace of local
“responsiveness” and tolerance for national disparities – must be balanced against
“capacity.” With respect to norm generation, this will always be a contestable measure.
One person’s “community” is bound to be another’s “unrepresentative pocket.”
Moreover, there will be more objective, or at least exogenous, aspects to capacity that
implicate the permissible scale for the administration of justice in a liberal democratic
polity. Recent reports from Ferguson, Missouri,131 and elsewhere drive the lesson home:
If a political unit is not big enough to supply adequately trained police and prosecutors or
support a court system not constrained to self-finance, it needs to be right-sized (to draw
on a current managerial trope).
The institutional design “solution” may lie in overlapping jurisdictions, with more
ostensibly responsive local establishments balanced by national or subnational (but supralocal) prosecutors whose deficiencies with respect to local knowledge and communal
preferences find compensation in a perspective less tethered to local leaders and
pathologies. Even as I am reluctant to valorize the American federal system – whose
129

Nicola Lacey & David Soskice Why are the Truly Disadvantaged American, When the UK is Bad
Enough? A Political Economy Analysis of Local Autonomy in Criminal Justice, Education, Residential
Zoning 29, 35 (2013) (unpublished manuscript), at 29, 35 (2013 draft) (arguing that “diffusion and
localisation of democracy has been one of the most powerful institutional factors in shaping America’s
distinctive patterns of crime, punishment, segregation and indeed social inequality” and that “more
centralised systems avoid the negative externalities of local decision-making characteristic of the US”).
130

Jacqueline Hodgson & Andrew Roberts, An Agenda for Empirical Research in Criminal Justice:
Criminal Process and Prosecution, at 22 (2010 draft).
131

U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Civil Rights Div., Investigation of the Ferguson Police Department (2015)
(highlighting focus of Ferguson law enforcement on generating revenue).

29

floating federal “responsibilities”132 bring their own accountability challenges – the gains
when one prosecutorial level is able to hold another’s feet to the fire are undeniable. This
may play out in policy decisions – as when one prosecutor publically questions the
priorities and decisions of another – or corruption cases against prosecutors themselves
and their allies.
Note that the value of a second level of prosecutors is not just a matter of perspective but
institutional capacity. If prosecutors are to make a sustained contribution to democracy –
one that goes beyond shepherding cases through the adjudicative process – they need the
capability to either investigate or cause the investigation of the crimes that don’t involve
manifest disorder of the sort that attracts police attention. I hesitate to specify the
institutional arrangements that would best foster prosecutorial attention to domestic
violence, corruption, and other such cases that strike at the heart of individual autonomy
and political functionality. One can imagine, in theory, a wide range of possibilities –
including overlapping jurisdictions (Robert Cover spoke of the “complex concurrency” of
the American system133), dedicated police-prosecutor squads, and the like. Indeed, even
though a prosecutorial office is freer to invest investigative and adjudicative resources in
this critical subset of cases when it is not constrained by the principle of legality, some
combination of political will and institutional accounting can perhaps obtain the same
result where that principle is respected. Theory, though, has its limits, and if care is not
taken, these cases can easily get slighted.
3. Information Use/Collateral Consequences
Another principle requiring translation across different prosecutorial orders goes not to
which cases will be brought but how all adjudicated cases will be received. What volume
control will there be on prosecutorial articulations of criminality? Perhaps there should
be an “acoustical separation” that, by dampening how prosecutors can construct
citizenship, might compensate for deficiencies in their accountability?134 This
dampening could limit the social and political meaning of a decision to prosecute that
ends in a criminal conviction.
Some aspects of this meaning are endogenous to a polity’s criminal process – the
definition of an offense, the mode of proof, and the nature and severity of the sentence.
Affecting all will be the legitimacy of the state generally and of its authority to punish
specifically.135 Important aspects of a conviction’s meaning, however, are exogenous to
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the adjudicative process and are subject to regulatory decisions (or non-decisions) that
can substantially limit a prosecutor’s power to shape the social order. A well-functioning
democratic order would attend to these regulatory decisions, which optimally would
reflect a polity’s considered judgment both about authority already delegated to
prosecutors and the degree to which it should be extended to other domains.
Americans have been coming to grips with the authority – by default or otherwise – that
has been effectively given to prosecutors by laws and rules that make criminal
convictions into automatic triggers for a slew of “collateral” consequences. Frequently,
convicted felons will lose the ability to vote, even after they are released from prison. In
Europe and elsewhere, debate rages about whether those incarcerated should lose the
right while serving their sentence. An accountability lens offers no clearer resolution of
these issues than it does on the qualitatively different issue of sentence severity.
Powerful arguments that it is a grievous category mistake to deprive convicted offenders
of basic citizenship rights may, for some, find answer in a communitarian logic.136 Yet
an accountability lens highlights the fact that the United States, where prosecutors are the
least susceptible to granular accountability for their charging decisions, is also the least
attentive to the weight that other authorities give those prosecutorial interventions postconviction.
There is no grand paradox here. The fragmentation of governmental authority in the
United States and the status accorded prosecutors goes far to explain the cascading (and
often personally devastating) consequences that attend an adjudicated decision to charge,
with legislators and regulators quick to pile on. Indeed, a political status perspective may
explain the degree to which the United States (as a fragmented collective) allows the
articulations of its prosecutors to shape the rest of a defendant’s life. That, combined
perhaps with different views about the “ownership” of information about public
(including criminal) processes, may explain the very different approaches to criminal
records information in the United States and Europe. As James Jacobs has
comprehensively shown, while “American criminal records are exceptionally public,
exceptionally punitive, and exceptionally permanent,”137 the European Union and its
member states, by contrast,
treat individual criminal history information as personal data that the individual
has a right not to have disclosed by government personnel or by private parties.
Consequently, police records do not circulate at all, court records are not open for
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public examination and (except in Sweden) private firms are not permitted to sell
criminal record information to employers, even if they could obtain it.”138
Still, the diversity in criminal information regimes – and in the varying degrees to which
prosecutors are allowed to construct citizenships – usefully pushes us to think harder
about the relationship between prosecutors’ accountability and their authoritative
narrative power.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The role of prosecutors in a liberal democracy entails standing apart from the polity,
speaking for and to it, and being true to its laws and values. One might see this as an
existential dilemma, but I prefer to take it as a law and institutional design challenge – a
challenge that probably does not have a single optimal solution (or at least one
constitutionally attainable across all jurisdictions). Above all, it is a challenge to reason:
to hold people and institutions to account, and to be able to give an account of oneself.
Prosecutors in the United States have been rightfully pressed in recent years to give a
better account of themselves. But so too have prosecutors in other countries. Before
resorting to transplantation or even just intellectual valorization, more thought should be
given to the trade-offs inherent in each set of institutions. The quiet claim here is not that
any particular prosecutorial establishment necessarily must trade off one democratic
citizenship enhancing project for another. That a prosecutor has a sustained commitment
to going after corruption and domestic violence should not insulate her from challenges
that, for example, she is doing a poor job at modulating punitive outcomes. Still, unless
we think beyond basic typologies, variations in institutional design will determine the
likelihood that different projects will be pursued and with what effectiveness. As
jurisdictions contemplate reform, they should therefore consider not just what is missing,
but what they might lose.
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